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In this paper, I present a reinterpretation of the no-go theorem for quantum bit ommitment
protools of Mayers, Lo and Chau. I'm willing to larify some unlear arguments in the original
proofs of the authors, primarily onerning lassial omputations and ommuniations in a general
protool. I also extend the theorem to over a ertain partiular honest third-party protools. The
extension also overs oin-ipping based protools, similarly to a result of Kent.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit ommitment, oblivious transfer and oin ipping
are three primal primitives of Modern Cryptography,
used to onstrut seure omputation for generi two-
party funtions [1℄. Reall that by denition:
• Bit ommitment is a protool where Alie sends the
ommitment information about a seret bit to Bob,
who annot disover the bit. And after an arbitrar-
ily long time, when Alie is supposed to reveal the
bit, Bob an detet if Alie hanges the value of the
ommitted bit.
• Oblivious transfer is a two-party omputation pro-
tool permitting Alie to send two seret bits to
Bob who an hoose to gain one and only one of
these while Alie annot know Bob's hoie.
• A related sheme is Coin ipping whih is a proto-
ol for Alie and Bob sharing a fairly random bits,
i.e. none of the parties an aet the probability
distribution of the outome.
In lassial ryptography, suh two-party protools
annot be made with unonditional seurity, a term rst
dened by Shannon [2℄, but with omputational seu-
rity aepting some unproven assumptions on the modern
omputing model [1, 3℄. When passing to quantum era,
while quantum key distribution had been being proved to
be seure [4, 5℄, two no-go theorems were issued: quan-
tum bit ommitment is impossible [6, 7℄ quantum seure
two-party omputations and so oblivious transfer are im-
possible [8℄. Beause of the similarities between the no-
go theorems for quantum bit ommitment and quantum
oblivious transfer protools, one used to talk only about
the theorem of quantum bit ommitment.
One ould say that the theorem on the impossibility of
unonditionally seure quantum bit ommitment [6, 7℄,
with the theorem on the possibility of unonditionally se-
ure quantum key distribution [4, 5℄, are among the most
interesting subjets in the eld of quantum ryptography.
Moreover, they ould lead to philosophial thoughts on
the quantum theory [9, 10, 11℄.
However, the interpretation of the no-go theorem on
quantum bit ommitment remains unlear and auses re-
searhers not to ease to either hallenge it [12, 13, 14℄,
or onrm it [9, 15, 16℄, or reestablish it [17℄. Indeed, in
the main interpretation of Mayers' and Lo-Chau's proofs,
the impossibility of quantum bit ommitment is simply
derived from a property of the pure bipartite quantum
states whih leads to the fat that if a bit ommitment
protool is seure against Bob before the opening, then
Alie an use a loal transformation to hange her se-
ret. Meanwhile the theorem is laimed to be valid for
all general protools using hybrid quantum and lassi-
al ommuniation and omputation [6, 7℄. This laim
of generalization is not evident to be aepted, beause
it is not lear to see how the proofs over all possible
protools. In fat, a general protool an onsist of
1. lassial omputations with random serets,
2. ommuniations via a lassial hannel that does
not permit a pure two-party model.
Another interesting problem is to onsider the rela-
tion between these three primitives. It was shown that
bit ommitment implements oin ipping and is imple-
mented by oblivious transfer [3℄, while oblivious trans-
fer an be built from bit ommitment by transmitting
quantum information [18, 19℄. Nevertheless, Kent gured
out that quantum bit ommitment annot be built from
oin ipping [20℄, whih is also banned from being imple-
mented in the sope of quantum mehanis by other no-
go results: quantum oin ipping is impossible [21℄, even
non-ideal quantum oin ipping with arbitrarily small
bias [22℄.
The aim of this paper is to reinterpret one more the
no-go theorem of bit ommitment for general protools
onsisting of quantum and lassial omputations and
ommuniations. In our interpretation, we larify the
presene of a marosopi hannel. This reinterpretation
would be expeted to be helpful for people who are going
to be interested in this troubling theorem.
To set the stage, we re-expose rst, in Se. II the
main interpretation of the no-go theorems for quantum
bit ommitment and quantum oblivious transfer in a de-
terminist purely quantum model. In Se. III, we present
2our main reinterpretation of theorem, larifying two as-
pets of general protools: lassial omputations with
random serets and ommuniations via a lassial han-
nel. Finally, in Se. IV, we extend the no-go theorem for
some partiular trusted third-party models by showing
ertain features of the models penalized by the theorem.
A no-go result on oin-ipping based bit ommitment
protools similar to Kent's [20℄ an be easily obtained
from these extensions.
II. NO-GO THEOREMS IN THE DETERMINIST
BIPARTITE MODEL
A. Quantum bit ommitment
We an see any bit ommitment protool as a two-
phase omputation, jointly made by Alie and Bob. After
a rst phase - ommit phase, the omputation is inter-
rupted, and then ontinued in the seond phase - opening
phase. The omputation has the prime input: Alie se-
ret bit to be ommitted to Bob, and should give three
output: 0 - as Bob is onvined that Alie's input is b = 0;
1 - as Bob is onvined that Alie's input is b = 1; and
⊥ as any heating user is deteted by the other.
As the detetion of Bob's heating would rather be
made before the opening phase, we are only interested in
the privay against Bob's (onealment) and the dete-
tion of Alie's heating (binding), one the ommit phase
has ended, i.e. the omputation has been interrupted.
In the lassial determinist omputation model, we an
easily show that suh a sheme is impossible. Indeed, we
onsider the omputation as the evolution of the image
that onsists of variables assigned with values. Following
a determinist algorithm, the omputation is desribed by
a determinist sequene of images Iinit, .., Ifinal. At eah
step i, the image of the joint omputation is the state of
all variables, divided into two parts: Alie's variables and
Bob's ones, i.e Ii = I
A
i ⊗ IBi . For the omputation of b,
the omputation image sequene following the algorithm
will be {Ii(b)}n. At the interrupted step int, the image
is Iint(b) = I
A
int(b) · IBint(b) where  · denotes the onate-
nation. For the protool being onealing, the partial
images at Bob side must be idential: IBint(b) ≡ IBint(1).
Therefore, Alie an freely hange the omputation by
replae IAint(0) with I
A
int(1) or vise-versa before the open-
ing phase. Thus, the protool an not be both onealing
and binding.
In the quantum determinist model, the joint ompu-
tation an be regarded as in the lassial model above.
However, the omputation is more physial like: the im-
age of the omputation at a moment is desribed by the
state at that moment of all partiipating quantum sys-
tems. The transition from one image to another sues-
sive image is made by loal unitary transformations at
Alie's and Bob's sides and the ommuniation between
them.
In [19℄, Yao dened a quantum two-party protool as a
pair of quantum mahines interating through a quantum
hannel. The protool is exeuted on a joint system on-
sisting of Alie's mahine HA, Bob's mahine HB, and
the quantum hannel HC . The exeution is alternating
rounds of one-way ommuniations. For eah round, one
partiipant D ∈ {A,B} performs a unitary omputation
in the joint spae of his private system HD and the mes-
sages HC . The messages will be taken to the loation of





FIG. 1: Quantum two-party model
This model has been used as a standard for analyz-
ing quantum ommuniation in quantum protools, e.g.
the omplexity of quantum ommuniation [23, 24℄ and
quantum interative proofs [25℄. It was also used in the
Lo & Chau's proof of the inseurity of quantum protool
for bit ommitment [7, 9℄.
But, as the quantum ommuniation does not play an
important role in the proof, it's is not neessary to sep-
arate ommuniation quantum systems from the others.
The presene of the HC would be redundant. Indeed, in
[7℄, the authors must assume that the hannel after the
ommitment phase is in a pure state|u〉C . This assump-
tion is not evident, and may trouble the readers without
expliation. For instant, we an use a EPR-pair hannel
for teleporting of quantum states [26℄, and the EPR-pair
hannel must be separated from the other omputational
systems to guarantee that these EPR pairs are used only
for the ommuniation of quantum signals by teleporta-
tion. In [9℄, the hannel systems C must be split into two
parts in possession of Alie and Bob. We would rather
simply onsider a purely quantum protool is a pair of
Alie and Bob mahines and quantum partiles are faith-
3fully brought from sender's mahine to reeiver's mahine
in ommuniation.
Similarly to the lassial ase, aording to a determin-
ist algorithm, Alie and Bob must prepare two quantum
system A and B, haraterized by H = HA,init⊗HB,init,
initially in some determined pure state |ψ(b)init〉 =
|ψ(b)〉A,init ⊗ |0〉B,init. At step init ≤ i < final, Alie
and Bob realize a joint omputation Ui = UA,i ⊗ UB,i
on |ψ(b)i−1〉 to get |ψ(b)i〉 and ommuniate to ex-
hange some subsystems, and then, the image |ψ(b)i〉 is
split into two parts aording to the new deomposition
HA,i ⊗ HB,i = H. The ommuniation is not restrited
to be one-way. We see that H is invariant, but its deom-
position into Alie and Bob's parts varies by ommuni-
ations. The omputation is then a determined sequene
of images |Ψ(b)init〉 , .., |Ψ(b)final〉.
At step i, the orresponding image |Ψ(b)i〉 is split into
two partial images at Alie and Bob sides:
ρA(b)i = trB,i(|Ψ(b)i〉 〈Ψ(b)i|),
ρB(b)i = trA,i(|Ψ(b)i〉 〈Ψ(b)i|).
If the protool is unonditionally onealing then Bob
have not to be able to distinguish ρB(0)i from ρ
B(1)i
for all i ≤ int where int is the interruption step, i.e.
∀i ≤ int, ρB(0)i = ρB(1)i. Here, it sues to be only
interested in ρB(0)i = ρ
B(1)i at the interruption step
i = int. For simplifying, we will use HA ⊗ HB instead
of HA,i⊗HB,i to impliitly speify the deomposition at
the moment of speaking.
We ould expet that Alie annot replae ρA(0) with
ρA(1) and vie-versa beause of the entanglement in
|Ψ(b)〉. Unfortunately, following [27℄, in ase ρB(0) =
ρB(1), there exists an unitary transformation UA ating
in HA that maps |Ψ(1)〉 into |Ψ(0)〉. Therefore, Alie
an replae the partial image by the operators UA and
U−1A . We would rather say that quantum entanglement
does not help to seure bit ommitment.
More generally, quantum model allows a non-ideal un-
onditional seurity, i.e ρB(0) ≈ ρB(1). The seurity
of Alie's bit an be measured by the distinguishability
between ρB(0) and ρB(1), for instant the delity of quan-
tum states:
F (ρB(0), ρB(1)) = 1− ǫ. (1)
The extension of Uhlmann's theorem ([28℄ - exerise 9.15)
states that there exists a puriation |Ψ′(0)〉 of ρB(1)
suh that
| 〈Ψ(0)|Ψ′(0)〉 | = F (ρB(0), ρB(1)) = 1− ǫ.
Reall that there exists an unitary transformation for Al-
ie to swith between |Ψ′(0)〉 and |Ψ(1)〉. Therefore, sup-
pose that Alie has began the omputation for b = 1,
she an heat by transforming |Ψ(1)〉 into |Ψ′(0)〉 and
delaring b = 0. The opening phase will be ontinued
with |Ψ′(0)int+1〉 , ... |Ψ′(0)final〉 under unitary transfor-
mations. So:
| 〈Ψ(0)final|Ψ′(0)final〉 | = 1− ǫ.
A measure for Bob aepting Alie announement is
F (ρB(0)final, ρ
′B(0)final). Following Uhlmann's theo-
rem ([28℄ - theorem 9.4), we have
F (ρ(0)Bfinal, ρ
′B(0)final) ≥ 1− ǫ. (2)
Therefore, in a purely determinist quantum model, we
annot have a bit ommitment protool that is both on-
ealing and binding. Moreover, the more a protool is
onealing, the more it is binding, by the measure of
quantum delity, f. eqs. (1),(2).
B. Quantum oblivious transfer
We revise here Lo's theorem for one-sided omputa-
tions, inluding oblivious transfer, in a purely determinist
quantum model [8℄. The no-go theorem on bit ommit-
ment ould imply the impossibility of oblivious transfer
beause we an implement quantum oblivious transfer
from bit ommitment [19℄. But Lo's diret no-go the-
orem for seure one-sided omputation is worth to be
sripted here beause it suggests us gure out the simi-
larities when working only on the theorem for bit om-
mitment. Moreover, the proof inspires me to larify in
the following setions the EPR attak of the dishonest
user when the other honest would really uses lassial
seret and does the measurements.
To ompute f(i, j), Alie and Bob run together a uni-
tary U transformation on Alie's input |i〉 : i ∈ {i1, .., im}
joint with Bob's input |j〉 : j ∈ {j1, .., jn}. Other known
loal variables an be omitted without generalization. At
the end, Bob an learn the result from the output state
|vij〉 = U(|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B). But Alie an entangle her input





i |i〉D ⊗ |iA〉.







|i〉D ⊗ |iA〉 ⊗ |j1〉B , (3)






|i〉D ⊗ U(|iA〉 ⊗ |j1〉B).






|i〉D ⊗ U(|iA〉 ⊗ |j2〉B).
For the seurity on Alie side, the partial images must
be idential, i.e.
trB(|vj1〉 〈vj1 |) = trB(|vj2〉 〈vj2 |),
and then there exists a loal unitary transformation
U j1,j2 on Bob loal system suh that
|vj2〉 = U j1,j2 |vj1〉 .
4Therefore, beause D 〈i| vj〉 = 1√n |vij〉, the transforma-
tion U j1,j2 is universal for all Alie input i:
|vij2〉 = U j1,j2 |vij1〉 .
Bob an enter |j1〉, omputes |vij1 〉 and measures it to
learn f(i, j1). However, to enable Bob to unambiguously
get the result, |vij1〉 must not be perturbed by his mea-
surement. Bob an transform it to |vij2〉 by U j1,j2 , mea-
sures to learn f(i, j2), and so on. Thus, if the protool is
orret and seure against Alie, Bob an ompute f(i, j)
for any private input j.
III. INTERPRETATION FOR GENERAL
PROTOCOLS
The above proof for the impossibility of quantum bit
ommitment (and oblivious transfer) in a determinist bi-
partite purely quantum model is very nie, but is too
simple to be true for all possible protools where Alie
and Bob
1. do measurement on their quantum systems and
pass to lassial omputation;
2. introdue private random data or serets;
3. ommuniate lassial information through a
marosopi hannel that does permit to transmit
quantum signal.
Indeed, the proofs in Mayers' and Lo-Chau's original pa-
pers [6, 7℄ did not interpret in detail the redution of
general protools, larifying the above three fators. A
brutal redution of the general algorithms to the purely
quantum determinist two-party model ould make people
doubt its validity. The laim of the generalization of the
theorem aused troubled researhers to nd a loophole
behind [12, 13, 14℄.
Most of attention were paid to the two rst points [9,
12, 13, 14, 16℄. Indeed, from a omputational viewpoint,
the serets and random results of measurements are not
evident in the determinist model. As Alie's heating
transformation is found for the model where Bob do the
puriation of these random variables, the feeling is that
if honest Bob does the measurements, the global state
ollapses to a seret state depending on Bob's seret las-
sial results, and Alie annot know the orresponding
transformation.
People omitted easily the third point by some as-
sumptions on the ommuniation, normally expressed as
lassial ommuniation an be arried out by quantum
model, but with some onstraints [7℄. But what are the
onstraints? From the physial viewpoint, the lassial
hannel does not appear in this redued two-party quan-
tum model. The ommuniation of lassial outomes
fores real measurements. This point was only explained
in Mayers' version [6℄.
In the following, I will present the generalization of
the no-go theorems with a faithful interpretation of the
model for the physial systems in bit ommitment proto-
ols. The similarity an be applied to oblivious transfer
protools. This interpretation will larify two troubles
from the two above viewpoints:
• We show that EPR attaks of Alie is general in
spite of the fat that honest Bob really use lassial
seret variables and does the measurements in his
omputation.
• In presene of ommuniation of lassial messages,
Mayers has onsidered the seurity and heating for
eah quantum image ollapsed to a lassial mes-
sage sequene [6℄. We show that the seurity and
the heating an be analyzed for a puried protool
in a global view onsidering a marosopi hannel
for transmitting lassial message within the on-
epts of quantum mehanis.
A. Augmented model purifying private
randomness and serets
We onsider the seurity of quantum bit ommitment
with private serets and loal measurements in a aug-
mented model whih puries all these lassial variables.
For simplifying, we suppose that Alie and Bob ommu-
niate only quantum information. The ommuniation
via a lassial hannel will be onsidered in the following
setion.
We state that probabilisti omputations an be im-
plemented by invariant iruits with auxiliary random
variables and any lassial omputation an be realized
by equivalent quantum iruits, throwing a way some re-





Suppose that Alie and Bob possess two quantum ma-
hine with unlimited resoure. By these mahines Alie
5and Bob an realize all omputations at the quantum
level, by the purifying ation desribed as follows.
Suppose that following the algorithm, Bob prepares a
seret variable |i〉 whih is a random variable that take
value in {|1〉 , .., |n〉} with probabilities {p1, .., pn}, and
introdues it to a quantum gate that ompute
UB(|i〉B ⊗ |ψ(b)〉AB)
where |ψ(b)〉AB is used for the remaining quantum system
of the protool. Normally, for a perfet seret, p1 = .. =




pi |i〉B ⊗ |i〉D . (4)
Bob keep the quantum dieD for the puriation and use





pi |i〉D ⊗ UB(|i〉B ⊗ |ψ(b)〉AB).
Suppose that at some steps, Bob has to measure quan-
tum state |ψ(b)〉AB by an apparatus with n degrees of
freedom. Aording to the output i ∈ {1, .., n}, with
probability pb(i), the ollapsed state is |ψi(b)〉AB, and
Bob realize a quantum omputation UB ontrolled by
i, i.e. he produes a n-dimension quantum system of
B in the orresponding basis state, |i〉B, and applies
UB(|i〉B |ψi(b)〉AB).
Bob an instead introdue a n-dimension quantum sys-
tem in B, and a n-dimension quantum die in D for the





pb(i) |i〉D |i〉B |ψi(b)〉 , (5)





pi |i〉D UB(|i〉B |ψi(b)〉AB).
The above behavior an be seen as Bob is semi-honest.
Suh semi-honest ations are not detetable and must be
allowable beause the density matries of all systems are
the same as in a honest sheme. In fat, Bob respets the
speied algorithm but keep the puriation by quantum
dies for learning more, or the multiverse of the ompu-
tations orresponding to lassial variables [30℄. Suppose
that Alie keeps also all of the omputations at the quan-
tum level, but we are not interested in separating Alie's
quantum dies, and onsider them as normal system in
Alie's mahine.
Therefore, the joint omputation is a evolution on
HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HD where D is for Bob's dies whih are
seret and does not appear in the exeution of the pro-







where i represent all possible values for lassial serets
and measurements result of Bob, and |ψi(b)〉 is the ol-
lapsed quantum state aording to the lassial value i
when Bob is honest.
The puried protool is then surprisingly in a quan-
tum determinist model. And as Bob is allowed to use
the quantum mahine, the protool must be onealing
against this puriation as though D is fully ontrolled
by Bob's mahine, i.e:
ρBD(0) = ρBD(1).
It is lear that if Alie does not puried her omputations,
she annot strengthen this ondition beause her honest
behavior is as throwing away her dies from the above
puried sheme and does not hange ρBD(b).
Then, the theorem on the global puried system as-
sumes that Alie nds a heating unitary transformation
suh that
UA(|Ψ(1)〉) = |Ψ(0)〉 .
When honest Bob really do the measurement to use
lassial random serets, aording to his seret i ∈
{1, .., N}, the orresponding ollapsed state is |ψi(b)〉
may not be known to Alie. We have the felling that Alie




pb(i) |ψi(b)〉 = D 〈i|Ψ(b)〉, the
transformation UA is universal for all of Bob's serets,
i.e.
UA(|ψi(1)〉) = |ψi(0)〉 . (6)
Even in a weaker ase where F (ρBD(0), ρBD(1)) = 1− ǫ,
as shown in setion IIA, there exist a puriation |Ψ′(0)〉
of ρBD(1) satisfying with | 〈Ψ′(0)|Ψ(0)〉 | = 1 − ǫ, and
Alie an nd UA:










Alie an use this unitary transformation to heat. Here,
in spite of the fat that there may exist some las-
sial output i with it, Alie fails to heat beause
| 〈ψi(0)|ψ′i(0)〉 | ≪ 1, but the average of Alie's possi-






p1(i) | 〈ψ′i(0)|ψi(0)〉| ≥ | 〈Ψ′(0)|Ψ(0)〉 |
= 1− ǫ.
In onlusion, if a quantum protool with loal random
variables and measurements is onealing against Bob,
given that Bob has an unlimitedly powerful quantum ma-
hine, then it is not binding when Alie has an unlimit-
edly powerful quantum mahine. Intat, as all these loal
6lassial values an be puried by the quantum mahines,
f. g. 3, it is required to analyze the protool in the
puried bipartite model where the omputations beome
determinist. The omputation with lassial variables
and measurements of one user is as throwing some loal
systems away from the global puried model, an only




FIG. 3: Non-throwing superoperator
A game of seret parameters
Reall that, Bob's seret variables are analyzed by as-
signing to them a probability distribution, f. eq. (4),
normally a at distribution. But these variables are sub-
jetively random, not objetively random as in a mea-
surement in equation (5). We onsider only the dies in
D that purify these subjetively random variables, and
the dies purifying objetively random results of mea-






1/N |i〉D |ψi(b)〉AB ,





| 〈ψi(0)|UA|ψi(1)〉| ≥ 1− ǫ (7)
However, in reality Bob is free to hoose these vari-
ables, i.e. Bob an hoose any distribution for seret i.






where ω ∈ Ω ⊂ [0, 1]N for denoting the diusion re-
ated by Bob. Of ourse, for the seurity on Bob's side,
the protool must hold ∀ω, F (ρBω (0), ρBω (1)) ≥ 1− ǫ that
implies
∀i, F (trA |ψi(0)〉 〈ψi(0)| , trA |ψi(1)〉 〈ψi(1)|) ≥ 1− ǫ
and then for eah deision of Bob on ω, Alie has a or-
responding heating unitary transformation UA,ω:∑
i
pω(i)| 〈ψi(0)|UA,ω|ψi(1)〉 | ≥ 1− ǫ
The question is that, is there a protool whih is seure
against Bob, but Alie an not nd the universal heating
unitary beause of ω?
When the protool is ideally seure, then the answer
is No, beause Alie's transformation is universal, f. eq.
(6). For non-indeal ase, inspired from [8℄, we treat also
two following ases.
1. Case 1: Nǫ = δ ≪ 1
We see that, Alie's heating transformation for the
at distribution satises the inequality (7). Therefore,
for eah i,
| 〈ψi(0)|UAψi(1)〉| ≥ 1−Nǫ = 1− δ
and then, for any distribution used by Bob, the Alie's
possibility of heating is:
∑
i
pω(i)| 〈ψi(0)|UA,ω|ψi(1)〉 | ≥ 1− δ.
Cheung shown also a similar result [16℄.
2. Case 2: ǫ≪ 1 ≤ Nǫ
It may happen that, for any transformation UA,ω for
Alie, there exist a distribution ω′ that detets Alie
heating with signiant probability, i.e.
∑
i
pω′(i)| 〈ψi(0)|UA,ω|ψi(1)〉 | ≪ 1.
If suh a protool exists, we are in a trouble mental
game:
• If Alie xes a transformation UA,ω, then Bob an
hoose another distribution to detets Alie's heat-
ing with a greater probability. There may be a ol-
letion {ω1, .., ωk} for Bob.
• But, if Bob determines his distribution, Alie an
nd a heating transformation. Even if Bob ran-
domly hooses it from a olletion {ω1, .., ωk}, Al-
ie an treat it as a pure state by onsidering that













And as the protool must be seure against Bob,
i.e. F (trA(|0〉 〈0|), trA(|1〉 〈1|)) ≥ 1 − ǫ, Alie an









 | 〈ψi(0)|U∗A|ψi(1)〉 | ≥ 1− ǫ (8)
In fat, the same heating transformation UA,ω∗
for ω∗ being the mean distribution of ω1, .., ωk, i.e.
pω∗(i) = 1/k
∑k
j=1 pωj (i), an satisfy (8).
Thus, we have an innite dedution: (i) for heating,
Alie does not know whih is the value i of Bob's seret,
she should assign a at distribution to Bob's seret to
emulate the protool and nd out an optimal heating
transformation for the possibility 1 − ǫ as in equation
(7); (ii) but if she use this transformation, Bob ould
be determined to use ertain distributions {ω1, .., ωk} to
detet Alie's heating with signiant probability; (iii)
but if Bob's strategy is xed, Alie ould nd an optimal
heating transformation with possibility 1−ǫ, f. eq. (8);
(iv) ...
If suh a razy game exists, we onjeture that there
will be a good olletion {UA,ω1, .., UA,ωM} for Alie, us-
ing an independent random hoie, foiling Bob's strat-
egy [31℄.
B. Augmented model purifying lassial messages
In the previous setion, we shown that loal random
variables and measurements an be puried in Alie's
and Bob's quantum mahine. And in suh a ase, the bit
ommitment is impossible beause a property of bipartite
pure states. Moreover, Bob's honest strategy, that does
not take the puriation step, does not help to eliminate
Alie's heating strategy that puries all of Alie's loal
random variables and measurements.
But, in a general protool, Alie has to do the mea-
surements beause of the presene of a lassial hannel.
Imagine that in the speiation of a protool, at a
ertain moment, a party has to measure some quantum
state |psii〉 with an apparatus with n degrees of freedom
and ommuniate this result to the other via a lassial
hannel. This measurement will output i ∈ {1, .., n} with
probability p(i) and let the measured system in a state
|ψi〉. Reeiving the lassial value i, the reeiver ould
generate a basis state |i〉 in a n-dimension spae for his
further omputation.
Of ourse, we an redue this ommuniation to a






p(i) |ψi〉S ⊗ |i〉R
and the protool will go on orretly beause the density-
matrix desription of eah system is the same as though
a real measurement is done. The joint omputation re-
main then an evolution of a pure bipartite state. Lo &
Chau have proved the impossibility of quantum bit om-
mitment protool based on this redution [7, 9℄, and with
suh a quantum bipartite joint omputation, bit ommit-
ment is impossible as analyzed in the previous setions.
The above quantum ommuniation of lassial mes-
sages gave to the partiipants an extra bipartite entan-
glement that does not exist in the speiation of the
protool with lassial ommuniation. Indeed, it ould
happen that if the reeiver used the reeived message to
do some quantum omputation and sends bak the result,
the sender ould learn more information with entangle-
ment attak by the eet of super-dense oding [32℄.
But, suh an bipartite entanglement should be de-
stroyed by the measurement beause of the lassial han-
nel. The real joint omputation with ommuniation by
measuring and transmitting lassial values via a lassi-
al hannel is not an evolution on a pure bipartite state.
The lassial hannel fores the measurements to be done
for making lassial signals. Although a quantum proto-
ol with ommuniation of lassial messages an be or-
retly implemented in a purely quantum bipartite model.
It ould be used to prove the possibility [19℄, not the
impossibility. We have right to doubt that the redued
two-party model may implement orretly the protool,
not seurely.
What is the dierene between a quantum hannel and
a lassial one? A quantum hannel is a medium that we
an used to transmit diretly a quantum state without
disturbing it while a lassial hannel, for transmitting
disrete messages, permits only one from a olletion of
disrete signal values. For example a marosopi ele-
trial wire with tension +5V for 0 and −5V for 1.
It is natural to think that in reality a lassial hannel
is well oupled with the environment, and the deoher-
ene is so strong that the messages are measured by a
CNOT like gate. These qubits are also amplied, i.e.
opied by an innite quantum systems on the lassial
hannel, i.e. a qubit |i〉 beomes |i〉 ⊗ |i〉E [29℄.
Yao's model for two-party protools should be general-
ized as a pair of quantum mahines interating through
a quantum hannel and neessarily a lassial hannel.
The model onsists of two mahines HA,HB , a quan-
tum hannelHC for both quantum and lassial messages
and a trusted measurement mahineM with anillasHE .
The measurement is in fat a CNOT-like gate whose on-
trolling inputs are in the spae of the sender's lassial
messages and targets are anillas in the marosopi en-
vironment spaeHE , f. gure 4. In eah ommuniation
8round, a partiipant D ∈ {A,B} does an unitary om-
putation on HD ⊗ HC ; the trusted mahine applies the
CNOT gate to the lassial messages in HC and the
environment of the lassial hannel HE . The quantum
messages and lassial messages in HC are taken to the




FIG. 4: Quantum protool with a lassial hannel
Here, HE is not ontrolled by any partiipant, and
the images of the protool are not pure states lying in a
bipartite spae for quantum systems in Alie' and Bob's
mahines anymore. Nevertheless, it's a three-partymodel
where the systems inM play a passive role via the CNOT
gates, make us have to leave the puried model, f. g.
3 and turn bak to the superoperator model, f. g. 2.
Thus, it is not evident to emulate the protool by a pu-
ried bipartite model for proving the inseurity without
a onvining interpretation.
The strength of the proof lies in its generality.
The idea is to treat the whole system as if it
were quantum mehanial, extending the part
that was originally quantum to inlude any
die, measuring devies, and lassial ompu-
tations that appear in the protool. From this
point of view, the original protool is equiv-
alent to a purely quantum one, with some of
the output being thrown in the trash. Note
that throwing something away an never help
a heater, so we might as well assume that
the state shared by Alie and Bob is the pure
quantum state that is ompletely determined
by the protool. That assumption substan-
tially redues the omplexity of the problem.
It is not diult to show that when Alie and
Bob hold a pure state, quantum bit ommit-
ment is impossible [33℄.
This argument is not enough, and double-faed. Indeed,
the lassial hannel fores throwing something to the
environment and destroys the purity of bipartite states,
f. g. 4. As this ation an never help a heater, why
it does not prevent Alie from heating?
Here, we prefer Mayers' version that treated also the
measurements done for making lassial messages [6℄.
Following Mayers, as the measurements an make losses
of information, Alie and Bob would rather keep all of the
operation at the quantum level, exept for making las-
sial messages. Thus, for eah lassial message γ, the
quantum system ollapsed with the orresponding lassi-
al outome is in a known pure bipartite state |ψb,γ〉AB,
and the the trade-o between onealing and binding is
separately treated for this state, i.e. the ollapsed proto-
ol must be seure:
Fγ = F (trA(|ψ0,γ〉 〈ψ0,γ |), trA(|ψ1,γ〉 〈ψ1,γ |)) ≥ 1− ǫ
and Alie has a unitary heating transformation UA,γ
with possibility of suess
| 〈ψ0,γ |UA,γ |ψ1,γ〉 | = Fγ ≥ 1− ǫ.
However, a protool seure against Bob is not neessar-
ily seure for all possible ollapsed protools orrespond-
ing to all possible lassial exhanged messages, but on
average. For example, Fγ ould be small for some γ but
the ourring probability of γ is small. Moreover, it an
happen that the ourring probabilities of γ for the om-
mitment of 0 and 1 are dierent, i.e. p0(γ) 6= p1(γ).
What are then the measures of average onealment and
binding?






and then the average heating possibility of Alie an be∑
γ
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The fat is that F ′ ≤ F ([28℄ - theorem 9.7). What is
then the heating possibility of Alie?
We would one more return to a global model purifying
all lassial random variables. In this part, we will try
to interpret these average measures by onsidering them
in a faithful model purifying lassial messages by the
onept of deoherene in quantum measurements.
In our model, the ommuniation of quantum messages
makes only a repartition of quantum partiles in Alie
and Bob's mahines. Nevertheless, we will separately
analyze the ommuniation of lassial messages via a
marosopi hannel as follows:
91. The sender S ∈ {A,B} has to measure some quan-
tum state |ψ〉AB with an apparatus with n degrees.
This measurement will output i ∈ {1, .., n} with






p(i) |ψi〉AB |i〉S |i〉E,S
where HE,S is for the marosopi part in the mea-
surement devie lost to the environment that ause
the impurity of sender's state [34℄, and |i〉S is for
memorizing the result.
2. The sender send the signal i via a marosopi
hannel where the signal an be innitely ampli-
ed by the environment E:
|i〉S → |i〉S ⊗ |i〉E .
3. The signal is amplied, and propagates to the re-
eiver's devie, where the orresponding quantum
state |i〉 will be generated for the reeiver's quan-
tum mahine R = {A,B} \ {S}:
|i〉E → |i〉E ⊗ |i〉R .
Therefore, we an see this proess ats on a pure state,
but in a larger spae overing Alie's, Bob's mahine and





p(i) |i〉S |i〉E∗ |i〉R |ψi〉AB
where E∗ denotes all systems of the environment, and
S,R denote the ontrollable quantum systems in Alies
and Bob's mahines. The initial states of systems storing
the lassial messages in this proess are not important,
and denoted by |0〉S,R,E∗. So, by introduing the environ-
ment systems E∗, the exeution of the protool is seen as
a determinist unitary evolution of the global three-party
state lying in HA ⊗HB ⊗HE∗.
Moreover, the image of the protool at any moment





pb(i) |i〉E∗ |i〉A |i〉B |ψi(b)〉AB (9)
where i is any possible lassial message, and |i〉A , |i〉B
appear for the fat that Alie and Bob an dupliate and
memorize the message forever in their mahines.
For the seurity on Bob's side, the protool has to as-
sume
F (ρB(0), ρB(1)) ≥ 1− ǫ
where








FIG. 5: Entanglement onnetions via lassial messages
Of ourse, Alie an only ontrol the quantum systems
in his mahineHA⊗HMA . In the ommuniation proess,
the information may be lost onforming to the inequality:
F (ρB,E∗(0), ρB,E∗(1)) ≤ F (ρB(0), ρB(1))
where ρB,E∗(b) = trA(ρ(b)).
Unfortunately, the environment only honestly ampli-
ed the signals. Beause, in the desription of |Ψ(b)〉,
|i〉E∗ is exatly the same as |i〉A, the equality is obtained:
F (ρB,E∗(0), ρB,E∗(1)) = F (ρB(0), ρB(1)) ≥ 1− ǫ.
Therefore, there exists an unitary transformation UA
suh that
| 〈Ψ(0)|UA|Ψ(1)〉| ≥ 1− ǫ
and this is a measure of Alie's average heating possi-
bility over all possible exhanged lassial messages.
In gure 5, we represent eah entanglement onnetion
via a lassial message i is presented by a line. The fron-
tier F1 at the limit of Alie ontrol gives Bob the same
information as at F2. The lassial hannel is noiseless
and does not help Bob. We an reall that a noisy han-
nel ould enable us to build unonditionally seure prim-
itives [35, 36℄.
This pure state may not exist in reality aording to
the Copenhagen Interpretation, beause Alie and Bob
should be in one of N situations, provided a ollapsed
state |i〉A |i〉B |ψi(b)〉AB with the orresponding proba-
bilities pb(i), i.e. we are provided instead a statistial
ensemble {pb(i), |i〉A |i〉B |ψi(b)〉AB}. We see that these
ollapsed states are the same as |ψγ,b〉 in Mayers' version
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for i = γ. In that ase, Alie's average heating possibil-





p1(γ)| 〈ψγ,0|UA|ψγ,1〉 | ≥ |〈Ψ(0)|UA|Ψ(1)〉|
≥ 1− ǫ
Nevertheless, aepting the onept of deoherene that
leads to the Many Worlds Interpretation, the pure global
state exists as the multiverse of lassial realms orre-
sponding to the ollapsed state [37℄. In anyway, the an-
alyst of the protool may keep this multiverse in mind
for a onvenient analysis of the average values over the
ollapsed exeutions.
C. Summary
In summary, the global puried model was obtained by
the puriation of loal random variables and exhanged
lassial messages, and an be illustrated as in gure 6.






pb(i, j, k) |i〉A |j〉B |k〉E∗ |ψi,j,k〉AB
And the exeution of the protool is sequene of deter-
minist unitary transitions between suessive images. It
is a parallel exeution of many honest sheme. For in-
stant, the real exeution of the protool orresponding
to Alie's variables i, Bob's variables j and exhanged












FIG. 6: The global puried model
Note that, if the puriation of loal variables i and j is
really possible by Alie's and Bob's private dies in their
quantum mahines, the puriation of exhanged lassi-
al messages is more abstrat. The above puried pro-
tool is a quantum parallelism of ollapsed ounterparts
orresponding to eah exhanged lassial messages: the
image orresponding to the lassial message k lies in
the region marked by the dot line in the gure. It is nie
model for analyze the average values of onealment and
binding of the protools. Nevertheless, this puriation
desribes the real exeution of a protool if the nature
follows the theory of deoherene and Many worlds in-
terpretation.
IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE NO-GO THEOREMS
We are depressed that quantum entanglement does not
help us to build bit ommitment, oblivious transfer, and
seure omputation protools. But we may not be overly
surprised at this beause lassial protools was also im-
possible.
We ould be satised to use a trusted third party for
unonditionally seure omputations. It is trivial when
we have a trusted third party for implementing these pro-
tools. For instant, in an oblivious transfer protool, Al-
ie sends b0, b1 and Bob sends c to Trent who is honest;
Trent sends bc to Bob. We all this as a trusted two-
party orale model, i.e. we onstrut a trusted iruit
with some inputs from Alie and Bob, and some outputs
bak to Alie and Bob.
A. Short-Term Orale based protools
In this setion, present an extension of the impossibil-
ity of quantum bit ommitment and oblivious transfer
for a partiular lass of trusted two-party orales, named
Short-Term Orales (ST-O). We dene ST-O as a trusted
two-party orale that implement any determinist algo-
rithm, using some loal variable, but it sends bak all
the nal values of all variables to either Alie or Bob.
Of ourse, lassially, we an implement seure om-
putations based on this ST-O. For instant, a iruit for
oblivious transfer with 2 input wires from Alie for b0, b1
and 1 input wire from Bob for c, that uses an loal vari-
able initialized to 0, an be built with logi gates for the
transitions:
{b0b1}A{c}B{0}T → {b0b1}A{c}B{(1− c).b0 + c.b1}T
and redirets wires A to Alie, B and T to Bob.
We bring this model to quantum information: the
quantum ST-O reeives quantum signal for inputs from
Alie and Bob; initializes neessary loal variables to |0〉;
applied the required omputation to these inputs; and at
the end splits all of the outputs, inluded the loal vari-
ables, into two parts, redirets one part to Alie, and one
part to Bob, f. gure 7. The exeution time of the om-
putation done by the third-party is a elementary unit,
and we an onsider as it immediately returns the results
to the partiipants.
We an extend the no-go theorems to a more surprising
result:
Theorem 1 (Extension of no-go theorems). Quantum
bit ommitment, quantum oblivious transfer using ST-Os
are imp
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FIG. 7: The quantum Short-Term Orale
In fat, when the third-party uses only pure states as
loal input, and immediately, splits and sends all of the
qubits whih partiipate to the omputations to Alie
and Bob, the global state at any onsidered moment is
in some known pure state, aording to the algorithm,
in a bipartite spae relating only Alie and Bob sides.
Therefore, the no-go theorems remain valid.
For example, we prove the impossibility of one-sided
seure omputation. As shown in the previous setion,
the average of seurity and heating possibility of any
protools with random variables, serets variables, and
lassial ommuniations, ould be analyzed in a deter-
minist puried model. It is then suient to prove the
theorem for this redued model.
We start with equation (3). Attahing a pure state







|i〉P ⊗ |i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B ⊗ |0〉A′B′ ·
At the end of the omputation, with help of the third-





|i〉P ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B ⊗ |0〉A′B′)
where system A′ is set to A, system B′ is set to B after
the split. Therefore, the remaining arguments of Lo's
proofs an be followed, f. setion II B.
B. A more general non-hiding third-party model
More generally, in a protool involving a trusted third
party whih an make measurements with some systems
thrown to a spae HE∗ unontrollable by Alie and Bob,
if whenever the third party throws some information to
E∗, a opy is also sent to Alie and to Bob, then the





pb(i) |i〉E∗ |i〉A |i〉B |ψi〉AB (10)
We see that in this three-party model involving Alie's
mahine, Bob's mahine and the systems in E∗:
• The systems in E∗ does not hide information from
Bob in a bit ommitment sheme. It ould be then
seen as a two-party model HA⊗ (HE∗⊗HB) where
HE∗ ⊗HB is for what Bob an learn about Alie's
seret and HA is for what Alie an fully ontrol to
heat.
• The systems in E∗ does not hide information from
Alie in an oblivious transfer sheme. It ould be
then seen as a two-party model (HA ⊗HE∗)⊗HB
where HA ⊗HE∗ is for what Alie an learn about
Bob's seret and HB is for what Alie an fully
ontrol to heat.
We an state that:
Theorem 2 (generalized no-go theorems). If at any time
the global state of a protool an be desribed by the form
as in eq. (10), where A,B denote the systems that Alie
and Bob an keep in their quantum mahines, then
1. any quantum system that is not ontrollable by Al-
ie does not hide information from Bob and bit
ommitment from is impossible;
2. any quantum system that is not ontrollable by Bob
does not hide information from Alie and oblivious
transfer is impossible.
C. Coin Flipping based protools
As a orollary of the extensions of the no-go theorems,
f. Setion IV, we onlude that
Corollary 1. Coin Flipping based Quantum Bit Com-
mitment and Quantum Oblivious Transfer are impossi-
ble.
In [20℄, Kent shown a similar result. In his paper, he
established a relativist model to implement oin ipping.
With an assumed quantum trusted party, we made the
model more omprehensible from a non-relativist point
of view.
We suppose that Alie and Bob have aess to a ST-O
that reates a pair of qubits in Bell state |Φ+〉 and sends
eah part to an user. With suh a ST-O, Alie and Bob
has a fair quantum oin that an realize lassial oin
ipping: Alie and Bob measure |Φ+〉 in the same basis
to share a random bit. However, quantum bit ommit-
ment and oblivious transfer are not realizable with this
ST-O, as shown by Theorem 1.
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We an also prove Corollary in a more diret manner
for lassial oin ipping. Suppose an orale that an
generate random bits and send two opies to Alie and
Bob. The lassial oins an be represented by
ρAB = (|0A0B〉 〈0A0B|+ |1A1B〉 〈1A1B|)/2
In an augmented model purifying this, we imagine that
Alie and Bob oins are entangled with a private oin of
the third party. The oins are then in a pure state
|C〉 =
√
1/2(|0〉A |0〉B |0〉O + |1〉A |1〉B |1〉O)
Suppose that a quantum protool implemented between
Alie and Bob requires Alie and Bob to share random
oins at some steps. Reall that just before the rst all
to the orale, the image of the protool is in a state of the
penalized form |Ψ〉 =∑Ni=1√pb(i) |i〉E∗ |i〉A |i〉B |ψi〉AB,





pb(i)/2 |ij〉E∗ |ij〉A |ij〉B |ψi〉AB
where O is thrown to E∗. We see that this formula is
also in the penalized form, f. eq. (10). Therefore, by
indution, with any suessive unitary transformation on
A,B ands request for random oins to the orale, the
global image of the protool remains in the penalized
form. Therefore, quantum bit ommitment and obliv-
ious transfer based on oin ipping are impossible, f.
Theorem 2.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, the exeution of any quantum two-party
protool between Alie and Bob ould be seen as de-
terminist unitary evolution of a pure state overing all
expliit quantum systems in the speiation of the pro-
tool, Alie's and Bob's quantum dies purifying random
variables and loal measurements, and environment's
dies when a marosopi hannel is used for transmitting
lassial information.
Environment's dies are not ontrollable by neither Al-
ie nor Bob. Then, the global state would rather be
a pure three-party state, not bipartite state. However,
they does not help to seure bit ommitment and obliv-






pb(i) |i〉E∗ |i〉A |i〉B |ψi〉AB
Therefore, the environment do not hide information from
Bob in a bit ommitment protool, and from Alie in an
oblivious transfer protool. The state ould be then seen
as a bipartite where E∗ is given to the observer, while
the other an fully ontrol its mahine to heat.
By the property of bipartite state, the no-go theorems
an be applied to protools that use a partiular trusted
orale that omputes any two-party funtion for Alie
and Bob but splits all output values to either Alie or
Bob. Nevertheless, with suh an orale, Alie and Bob
an require an EPR state |Φ+〉 split to them for imple-
menting oin ipping.
Of ourse, the no-go theorem an not be applied to
the lassial ounterpart of this kind of orale, beause
lassial information ould be amplied by quantum sys-
tems thrown to some hiding information environments.
However, if there are some systems being thrown to a
non-hiding information environment, expressed as in the
penalized form of eq. (10), the no-go theorems remain
valid.
With these generalization, we state that, with bipar-
tite oins
√
1/2(|0A0B〉+ |1A1B〉) and many-party oins√
1/2(|0A0B..〉 + |1A1B..〉), unonditionally seure two-
party bit ommitment and oblivious transfer remain im-
possible. Nevertheless, we an do many interesting tasks
with these oins: establishing seret key [38℄, reduing
ommuniation ost [32℄, teleporting unknown quantum
state [26℄, sharing serets [39℄, anonymously transmitting
information [40℄, ...
One more, within the sope of quantum mehanis,
the implementation of two-party seure omputation's
primitives an be done with ondition seurity that re-
quires assumptions on the limitation of the omputing
model [41, 42, 43℄, or the ommuniation media [35, 36℄.
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